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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-GENDER
DISCRIMINATION: THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE IS
GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE "CITIZEN-SOLDIERS"
OUT OF QUALIFIED WOMEN
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996)'
I. FACTS
In the words of the district court, "[i]t was May 1864 that the
United States and the Virginia Military Institute first confronted each
other [in] a life-and-death engagement on the battlefield .... The
combatants have again confronted each other .... this time ... in...
court. Nonetheless, . . . the struggle is nothing short of a life-and-death
confrontation." 2 Both were battles the United States refused to lose.
A. THE HISTORY OF THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE
The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is a rare military college that
has operated as a single-sex school since its creation in 1839.3 VMI
serves a distinct mission: to produce "citizen soldiers," honorable and
educated men who are suited for military and civilian leadership. 4 To
accomplish its mission, VMI employs an "adversative method" of edu-
cation unavailable at any other institution in Virginia. 5 The "adversative
method" stresses character development, physical and mental discipline,
I. Before reaching the Supreme Court this case progressed through the lower courts twice. First
the liability issue was litigated and appealed, thus the designation VMI I refers to both the district court
opinion and the court of appeals opinion on this issue. The cite VMI I encompasses United States v.
Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992). Next, the
remedial issue was litigated and appealed, thus the designation VMI II refers to both the district court
opinion and the court of appeals opinion on this issue. The cite VMI II encompasses United States v.
Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aft'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995) cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 281 (1995).
Although, the case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit en banc, which denied the application to
rehear, this case is not herein specially designated. VMI III is used to refer to the United States
Supreme Court decision of United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). For the sake of clarity,
the citations of VMI I and VMI II herein designate the court and the phase of litigation.
2. VMI I, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991) (district court-liability phase).
3. VMI III, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2269 (1996).
4. Id. A 1986 final report from the Mission Study Committee of the VMI Board of Visitors states:
It is the mission of the Virginia Military Institute to produce educated and honorable men,
prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued with love of learning, confident in the
functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service, advocates
of the American democracy and free enterprise system, and ready as citizen-soldiers to
defend their country in time of national peril.
VMi 1 766 F. Supp. at 1425 (district court-liability phase). As the Court points out, VMI has been very
successful in achieving its goal; among VMI's alumni are military generals, members of Congress, and
business executives. VMi i11, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
5. VMI III, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
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and a strong moral code.6 After four years in this unique system, VMI
graduates leave with an awareness of their capacity to deal with duress
and stress, a great sense of accomplishment, and connections to very
loyal alumni.7
VMI is a public school.8 Since its establishment, VMI has been
financially supported by the Commonwealth of Virginia. 9 Furthermore,
VMI is subject to the control of the Virginia General Assembly.10 Thus,
as a state sponsored school, VMI is subject to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11
B. VMI I: THE LIABILITY ISSUE. HAS VMI VIOLATED THE
CONSTITUTION?
In 1990, the United States Department of Justice brought suit
against the Commonwealth of Virginia and VMI to challenge the
school's exclusively male admission policy.' 2 The United States alleged
that VMI's admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 13
In VMI I, the district court recognized that the decision of Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan14 was controlling. 15 However, the
6. Id. The salient attributes of VMI's method are: physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality
of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.
Id. at 2270. The VMI method includes: a "rat line," which is an extremely stressful system that
reinforces class solidarity and a cadet's sense of accomplishment through minute regulation of
behavior, egalitarian treatment, frequent punishment, and rituals; the "class system," which rebuilds
the cadets by reinforcing VMI values through peer pressure; the "dyke system," which assigns an
upperclassman to each cadet to provide mentoring and some relief from the rat line; and the honor
code, which provides that a cadet "does not lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who do." VMI L 766 F.
Supp. at 1421-23 (district court-liability phase); see also VMI III, 116 S. Ct. at 2270-71 (describing the
adversative methods, but in less detail).
7. VMI III, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2270. Reportedly, VMI receives approximately one-third of its $32 million annual oper-
ating money from Virginia. Ellen Nakashima & Spencer S. Hsu, Allen to VMI: Admit Women or Be a
Pariah, WASH. PosT. Sept. 19, 1996, at B1; see also United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 93 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1995) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that in 1994 it was estimated
that Virginia gave VMI in excess of $10 million).
10. VMI IIIL 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "No State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. VMI never argued that there
was insufficient state entanglement with the school to exempt it from the constitutional requirement of
equal protection. See VMI 1, 766 F. Supp. at 1408 (district court-liability phase) (noting that Congress
could not pass a statute that would exempt VMI from the equal protection requirement).
12. VMI 11, 116 S. Ct. at 2271. The suit was prompted by a complaint from a female seeking
admission into VMI. Id. As the district court noted, the United States is authorized to bring
constitutional discrimination claims under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6. VMI I,
766 F. Supp. at 1408 (district court-liability phase).
13. VM IIII, 116 S. Ct. at 2271.
14. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Hogan involved a male who was denied admission to an all female
state supported nursing school. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719 (1982);
see infra text accompanying notes 96-116 (discussing Hogan).
15. VMI 1, 766 F. Supp. at 1410 (district court-liability phase).
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district court found several differences between the university in Hogan
and VMI.16 Thus, the district court rejected the claim that VMI's admis-
sion policy violated equal protection guarantees.17 The district court
reasoned that single-gender education provides substantial benefits, re-
gardless of which gender is favored.' 8  Furthermore, the district court
opined that VMI brought diversity to Virginia's higher education sys-
tem. 19 Evidence that admitting women would require alterations in
VMI's methods20 reinforced the district court's conclusion that VMI
had demonstrated sufficient constitutional justification for retaining its
male-only admission policy. 21
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court opin-
ion.22 The court of appeals held that the Commonwealth of Virginia had
not advanced any state policy that would justify its determination to
provide only men with the opportunity of diversity.23 The court stated
that "[a] policy of diversity which aims to provide an array of educa-
tional opportunities, including single-gender institutions, must do more
than favor one gender." 24 The case was then remanded to cure the
constitutional violation. 25 The court instructed that the Commonwealth
could choose to admit women into VMI, establish a parallel institution,
or abandon state support for VMI and allow the school to pursue its
objectives as a private institution. 26
C. VMI II: THE REMEDIAL ISSUE. WILL VMI ADMIT WOMEN?
The Commonwealth of Virginia chose to establish as its remedy a
parallel program for women, the Virginia Women's Institute for Leader-
16. Id. at 1410-11. There were two particularly relevant differences. First, in Hogan, excluding
men was not necessary to achieve its educational goals; whereas VMI would be fundamentally
different if it was forced to admit women. Id. at 1410. Second, in Hogan, the school had proffered
that its female-only admission policy was justified as compensatory affirmative action; whereas VMI
justified its male-only admission policy as diversifying the educational system. Id.
17. See id. at 1414 (explaining that VMI had established both prongs of the test: first, gender
discrimination served an important state educational objective by providing men with a beneficial
single-gender education and diversity; second, that the means chosen, excluding women, was the only
means to achieve this end).
18. Id. at 1411. Relying on evidence from experts in higher education, the court discussed that
persons who attend single-sex colleges are likely to achieve more academically and professionally.
Id. They are more academically involved, have frequent interaction with faculty, and have more
intellectual self-esteem. Id.
19. Id. at 1413. All other higher education institutions in Virginia are coeducational. Id. at 1419.
20. Id. at 1412. The court explained that allowance for personal privacy would have to be made,
physical education requirements would have to be altered, and the adversative system would probably
have to be eliminated. Id. at 1412-13.
21. Id. at 1413.
22. VMI I, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992) (court of appeals-liability phase).
23. Id. at 892, 898.
24. Id. at 899. VMI was the only single-gender institution out of 15 public higher education
institutions in Virginia. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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ship (VWIL) which would be located at Mary Baldwin College, an
established four year all-female private school. 27 The United States
objected to VWIL as an inadequate remedy. 28 Although the district
court noted that substantial differences existed between VMI and VWIL,
it found those differences pedagogically justified.29 The court approved
of VWIL as an appropriate remedy, stating that the controlling legal prin-
ciples did not require Virginia to provide women with a mirror image of
VMI.30 The district court poetically concluded its opinion by stating
that "[i]f VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary Baldwin [Col-
lege] marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is over, both
will have arrived at the same destination." 31
The United States maintained that the implementation of VWIL as a
remedy did not cure the constitutional violation. 32 Seeking an order that
VMI admit women, the United States again appealed to the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 33 It was the government's position that this suit
was brought on behalf of those women who wanted to attend VMI be-
cause of its demanding and challenging teaching methods. 34 The gov-
ernment asserted that the creation of the women's leadership program at
VWIL, which did not employ the adversative method, did little for those
women. 35
The court of appeals noted that applying traditional gender classifi-
cation analysis in this particular case might bypass any equal protection
scrutiny. 36 If homogeneity of gender in education was in fact an impor-
tant and legitimate state objective, then gender discrimination was by
definition necessary to accomplish this objective. 37 As a response to this
concern, the court of appeals adopted a third step for analysis of this
case. 38 The third step required an inquiry into the substantive compara-
bility of the mutually exclusive programs. 39
27. VMI II, 852 F. Supp. 471, 475 n.4 (W.D. Va. 1994) (district court-remedial phase).
28. See id. at 474 (urging that the Commonwealth was required to produce a plan that closely
resembled VMI).
29. Id. at 481. The district court relied on expert testimony to the effect that the VMI adversative
method would not be appropriate for most young women. Id. at 480. However, the court noted that
the VMI methodology could be used to educate some women, and in fact some may prefer the
adversative methodology. Id. at 481.
30. Id.
31. 1l at 484.
32. VMI II, 44 F.3d 1229,1234 (4th Cir. 1995) (court of appeals-remedial phase).
33. Id. at 1234.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1237.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The test used by the court of appeals included these three steps: first, whether the state's
objective of providing single gender education was a legitimate and important governmental objective;
second, whether the gender classification adopted directly and substantially related to that purpose;
and third, whether the resulting mutual exclusion of men and women from the individual institutions
326 [VOL. 73:323
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In performing the analysis the court of appeals noted that defer-
ence is to be given to legislative will so long as that will is not per-
nicious. 40 Since education was one of the most important functions of a
state government, 4 1 the adoption of single-gender education as one
particular technique of education was a legitimate and important govern-
ment objective. 42 The court recognized that the only way to realize the
benefits of homogeneity of gender was to restrict admission based on
gender. 43 The final step of the analysis presented two questions: how
are the benefits to be defined; and on what level or to what degree must
the benefits be comparable. 44 The court of appeals concluded that the
benefits need to be comparable in substance but not in form or detail, 45
and thus the Commonwealth's remedial plan was approved.46
In 1995, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to hear this
case en banc. 47 Holding firm to its position that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded Virginia from exclud-
ing women from VMI's unique educational experience, the United
States sought review from the United States Supreme Court.48
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
two issues: first, whether VMI's exclusion of women denied to women
"capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets"
equal protection of the laws pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; 49
and second, what remedy was required if VMI's admission policy
violated the Constitution. 50 On review, the United States Supreme Court




42. Id. at 1239.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1240.
45. Id. The United States urged that any such separate program for women must be identical to
that of VMI, and since that could not be done, VMI must admit women. Id.
46. Id. at 1241. The court discussed that both programs had the same goal and aimed to achieve
the same result of training citizen soldiers. Id. at 1240. The difference in approach used by the two
programs was attributable to professional judgment of how best to provide for the differences between
men and women. Id. at 1240-41. The Commonwealth had expert testimony that women may not
respond well to the adversative method of training and that such a program would attract an
insufficient number of women to make the program work. Id. at 1241. The court ignored the 347
applications from women that had been sent to VMI over the previous two year period. VMI I1, 116
S. Ct. 2264, 2271 (1996).
47. United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Six judges voted to rehear
the case en banc, four judges voted against rehearing, and three judges were recused. Id. Local rule
only permitted rehearing en banc on the vote of a majority of the circuit judges who were in active
service without regard to recusals. Id. at n. 1 (Motz, J., dissenting). This rule allowed the votes of four
judges to defeat the votes of six judges. Id. Judge Motz wrote an opinion dissenting from the decision
not to rehear the case, in which she concluded that as long as the Commonwealth provided support to
VMI, women should be given the opportunity to attend. Id. at 94.
48. VMI III, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2269 (1996).
49. Id. at 2274.
50. Id.
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held that VMI had not demonstrated an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for its male-only admissions policy,51 and that women who
sought admission and were fit for a VMI education could not be denied
admission. 52
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment man-
dates that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person ... the equal protec-
tion of the laws." 53 The Equal Protection Clause has long been under-
stood to guarantee personal and individual rights. 54 Individuals are
entitled to judicial protection because of their personal rights and not be-
cause of their status as a group member. 55 Moreover, individuals may
not be asked to suffer impermissible burdens in order to advance the
standing of their group.56 The Equal Protection Clause stands for the
proposition that the government must treat everyone as an individual, not
simply as a member of a class.57
In protecting individuals, equal protection analysis utilizes three
types of review. As a post Civil War Amendment, the quintessential aim
of the Equal Protection Clause is to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination. 58 Thus, the highest level of review, strict
scrutiny, is used to examine racial classifications. 59 Under this rigid stan-
dard of review, almost no classifications based on race have been up-
held.60 Rational basis, the lowest level of review, has less strict standards
51. Id. at 2281. The seven-to-one majority opinion was delivered by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Justice Clarence Thomas was recused. Id. at 2269. Justice Thomas did not participate in
the case because his son attends VMI. Eric Lipton, New vs. Old Dominion: Some Cling to a VMI Way
Others Say Is the Past, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A9.
52. VMI III, 116S. Ct. at 2287.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
54. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its
terms, creates personal, individual rights).
55. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978).
56. Id. at 298.
57. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). "[C]lassification[s] based upon the race of the
participants... must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources ip the States. This
strong policy renders racial classifications 'constitutionally suspect'...." McLauglin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
59. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. Strict scrutiny requires the classification to be necessary to the
accomplishment of a legitimate objective. Id. Strict scrutiny is not limited to racial classifications, it is
applied to national origin classifications. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)
(stating that excluding Celtic Irishmen would be inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment).
Fundamental rights, explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, are also subject to strict
scrutiny analysis. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
60. See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a city based minority set aside
program violated equal protection); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding
that preferential protection of minorities against layoffs violated equal protection); Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (holding that the special admissions policy used by the school for minorities violated equal
protection); Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a statutory scheme which prevented marriage
328 [VOL. 73:323
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to meet. 61  It is used in areas involving social or economic legislation
and requires that the classifications must not be arbitrary or irrational. 62
Most classifications that warrant rational basis scrutiny survive this def-
erential review. 63 The third level of review is intermediate scrutiny, a
heightened level of review which provides more protection than rational
basis review. 64 While intermediate scrutiny is the standard currently used
to examine gender-based classifications, 65 such classifications have not
always warranted heightened scrutiny.66
Historically, gender-based classifications gave the Court little pause
or concern. 67 This was because gender-based classifications were con-
solely on the basis or racial classification violated equal protection). However, the Court has
announced that strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2117 (1995); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1944) (upholding a
racial classification under strict scrutiny analysis).
61. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981). Rational basis review only requires the
classification to rationally advance a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective. Id.
62. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980) (stating that the
proper level of review for social and economic legislation is rational basis).
63. See Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 238-39 (upholding classification giving comfort allowances to
persons in public institutions receiving Medicaid funds but denying the allowance in public institutions
not receiving Medicaid funds); Fritz, 449 U.S. at 178-79 (upholding dual retirement benefits for those
workers that had a current connection to the railroad but not to other workers). But see Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 346 (1989) (striking down a
property tax assessment scheme using rational basis review).
64. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that between the extremes of strict
scrutiny analysis and rational basis review is intermediate scrutiny).
65. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 151 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that intermediate scrutiny is used to examine gender-based classifications). Intermediate
scrutiny is defined as the test which requires the questioned classification to be "substantially related"
to the achievement of an "important governmental objective." Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at
2109.
66. See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the Law,
14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 335, 338-39 (1992) (explaining the evolution of the standard used for gender
classifications).
67. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (stating that states are not precluded from
drawing a sharp line between men and women without violating the Constitution); see also Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (finding that in defining juror qualifications, states may
exclude women). Remarkably, some states were far more enlightened about their perception of
women in society. For example, in 1884, while Washington was still a territory, its supreme court held
that married women living with their husbands were competent to serve as grand jurors. Rosencrantz
v. Territory, 5 P. 305, 307 (Wash. 1884). A strong dissent wanted to protect women from that onerous
obligation, proposing that:
In the case of woman, it is not necessary that she should accept the obligation to secure
or maintain her rights. If it were, I should stifle all expression of the repugnance that I
feel at seeing her introduced into associations, and exposed to influences which .... must
... shock and blunt those fine sensibilities, the possession of which is her chiefest charm,
and the protection of which, under the religion and laws of all countries .... is her most
sacred right.
If one woman is competent as a juror, all women having the same qualifications
are competent. If women may try one case, they may try all cases. It is unnecessary to
say more; to suggest the shocking possibilities to which our wives, mothers, sisters, and
daughters may be exposed, [is] ... a mistaken construction of the law.
Id. at 310 (Turner, J., dissenting). It is worth remembering that in the United States, until 1920, women
did not have the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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sidered natural.68 The first hint that the Equal Protection Clause provid-
ed protection against gender-based classifications came in the ground
breaking case of Reed v. Reed.69 In Reed, the Court declared that ac-
cording different treatment on the basis of sex established a classification
subject to equal protection scrutiny. 70 The Court proceeded to strike
down the statute at issue which granted a mandatory preference of males
over females in appointing administrators for intestate decedents'
estates. 7 1 In Reed, the Court purportedly used the rational basis test.72
However, it was later acknowledged that a heightened level of review was
implicitly being applied. 73
In the past twenty-five years since the Reed decision, it has been
firmly established that gender-based classifications are indeed subject to
enhanced review. 74 The current level of review accorded .gender-based
classifications within the equal protection doctrine has been shaped by
three significant cases, one from each of the last three decades. 75
68. See Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466 (accepting that Michigan could deny to all women the oppor-
tunity to bartend, as long as the denial applied to all women). The extent to which gender classifi-
cations were considered natural is demonstrated by the early United States Supreme Court case of
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). In Bradwell, the Court affirmed the decision to deny
Mrs. Myra Bradwell admission to the practice of law in the state of Illinois. Id. at 139. In his concur-
rence, Justice Bradley explained:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector .... The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life. The constitution of the family organization .... indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The
harmony ... which belong[s] ... to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble .
offices of wife and mother. . . . In the nature of things it is not every citizen of every
age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every calling and position. It is the
prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason, and
experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions and callings [ .... ]
[I]t is within the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings
shall be filled and discharged by men ....
Id. at 141-42. This reasoning prompted a plurality of the United States Supreme Court to assert that the
tradition of "romantic paternalism" in our history had the effect of putting "women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (discussing
Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141).
69. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
70. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
71. Id. at 76. The Court stated that to give a mandatory preference to one sex over the other for
administrative efficiency was an arbitrary choice under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (noting that since Reed,
gender-based classifications have been subject to heightened scrutiny).
74. Id.
75. See Deborah L. Brake, Sex As a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to
Gender Discrimination, 6 SmroN HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 954-58 (1996) (discussing the history of the
Supreme Court's development of a standard of review for sex discrimination).
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In the first case, Craig v. Boren,76 the Court formally pronounced
that gender-based classifications warrant a heightened analysis.77 The
test announced in Craig requires that gender-based classifications "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives." 78
At issue in Craig was a statute which prohibited the sale of intoxicat-
ing beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to females under the
age of eighteen. 79 The Court accepted that the objective of the statute,
the enhancement of traffic safety, was an important governmental
objective. 80 However, the Court did not accept the proposition that the
gender-based distinction was closely linked to the objective of traffic
safety. 8'
Craig illustrated that gender may not be used as a proxy for more
relevant bases of classifications. 82 Furthermore, Craig established that
"archaic and overbroad generalizations" and "outdated misconceptions
concerning the role of females in the home" could not justify the use of
gender to support a state statutory scheme that was premised upon the
accuracy of those generalizations. 83 The decision in Craig was also im-
portant in that the Court applied the heightened scrutiny to a classifi-
76. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
77. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In 1973, gender-based classifications got as close
as they have ever been to becoming a suspect classification when a plurality of the Court held that
gender-based classifications were as repugnant to equal protection as classifications based on race
and national origin. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion). In
Frontiero, the plurality opined that the immutable sex characteristic was different from other
nonsuspect statutes, like intelligence or physical disability, because sex frequently bears no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society. Id. at 686-87. Sex classifications instead have the effect of
invidiously relegating women into an inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
individual members. Id. The plurality's decision in Frontiero, that sex was a suspect classification,
was premature and unnecessary according to three Justices, since the Equal Rights Amendment had
been approved by Congress and was awaiting ratification by the states. Id. at 692 (Powell, J.,
concurring). However, the Equal Rights Amendment was never adopted by a majority of the states.
See Patricia M. Wald, Some Unsolicited Advice to My Women Friends in Eastern Europe, 46 S MU L.
REV. 557, 565 (1992) (noting that the United States does not guarantee women the same rights given to
men since the Equal Rights Amendment was never ratified). A majority of the Court has never held
that gender is a suspect classification. See, e.g., VMI III, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276 (1996).
78. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
79. Id. at 191-92.
80. Id. at 199-200.
81. Id. at 200. The Court pointed out that there was only a two percent difference between the
percentage of men and women arrested for driving while under the influence. Id. at 201. While the
difference was not trivial in a statistical sense, for the purposes of equal protection it could not serve
as the basis for using a gender-based classification. Id. "Certainly if maleness is to serve as a proxy
for drinking and driving, a correlation of two percent must be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit."' Id.
at 201-02.
•82. Id. at 198 (involving drinking and driving).
83. Id. 198-99, 190-91.
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cation that disadvantaged men, 84 even though men have never suffered
as a disadvantaged class in our society.85
A slight shift in direction occurred after Craig which cast doubt on
the test it established.8 6 Speaking for a plurality in Michael M. v. Son-
oma County Superior Court,87 then-Justice Rehnquist pointed out that
the Court had trouble agreeing on the appropriate approach to and analy-
sis of gender-based classifications. 88 Justice Rehnquist directed that the
underlying tone of the previous cases required the traditional minimum
rationality test to take on a "sharper focus" when addressing gender-
based classifications. 89 However, in applying the Craig test, the plurality
focused on whether the sexes were "similarly situated" with respect to
the purpose of the statute. 90 The Craig test did not employ a "similarly
situated" analysis. 91 However, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority
of the Court in Rostker v. Goldberg,92 again employed the "similarly
situated" factor. 93 Thus, there was concern in both Michael M.9 4 and
Rostker95 that the Craig test was being brushed aside.
The second significant case, and arguably the most influential
gender-based equal protection case, Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, breathed new life into the intermediate scrutiny test.96 The issue
84. See id. at 191. Later cases follow the precedent of using a heightened analysis when men
challenge disadvantaging gender-based classifications. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
388 (1979) (using intermediate scrutiny to examine a statute which allowed unmarried mothers but not
unmarried fathers to object to the adoption of their illegitimate children).
85. Craig, 429 U.S. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist objected to the majority
allowing men challenging a gender-based statute to invoke a stringent standard of review. Id. at 217.
86. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 94 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that
although the Court purports to apply the Craig test, the analysis employed by the Court is significantly
different); Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 489 n.2 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting that the majority did not fairly apply the equal protection
analysis that was carefully developed in Craig).
87. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
88. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 468. The issue in Michael M. was whether California's statutory
rape law was unconstitutional because it made only men criminally liable for the act of sexual
intercourse. Id. at 466. The plurality held that the statute was constitutional since it realistically
reflected the fact that the sexes were not similarly situated in this context. Id. at 471-73.
89. Id. at 468 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 n* (Powell, J., concurring)).
90. See id. at 471-73 (discussing that males and females are not similarly situated because only
females can get pregnant).
91. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 94-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the difference between the
Craig test and the test used by the majority).
92. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
93. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 78. At issue in Rostker was whether requiring men and not women to
register for the draft was unconstitutional. Id. at 59. The Court held that men and women were not
similarly situated for purposes of the draft or registration for the draft since women were excluded
from combat. Id. at 78.
94. Michael M.. 450 U.S. at 489 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority was being
too deferential to the legislature in its review of the statutory rape law).
95. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court was substituting
"hollow shibboleths" about deference to the legislature for constitutional analysis).
96. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). The majority opinion was
authored by Justice O'Connor in which Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id. at 719. In
Michael M., Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 465. In
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in Hogan was whether a state statute, which excluded males from
enrolling in a state-sponsored professional nursing school, violated the
Equal Protection Clause.9 7 The Court directed that a party seeking to
uphold a gender-based classification must carry the burden of showing
an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification.98 To do
so it must at least be shown that the classification serves "important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." 99
The Court instructed that the test is straightforward; if anything, the
difficulty arises because the test must be applied free of fixed notions
about the abilities and roles of men and women.100 If the government's
objective reflects archaic notions about the need to protect one gender,
or stereotypes as to one gender's innate inferiority, the objective is
unlawful.101
Once it is determined that the government's objective is legitimate
and important, the direct link between the objective and the means
chosen, i.e., the gender-based classification, must be established. 102 This
requirement forces the reviewing court to determine whether the classifi-
cation was chosen after a reasoned analysis or whether it was simply the
product of applying stereotypes.103 Moreover, this prong ensures that
Rostker, White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 57. Thus, the dissenting
justices in Michael M., and Rostker were able to pull the Court back towards the Craig decision in
Hogan. In fact, the test from Hogan is arguably a stronger intermediate scrutiny standard than the one
employed in Craig. Brake, supra note 75, at 956.
97. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 719. Joe Hogan applied for admission into Mississippi University for
Women (MUW), and although he was qualified, he was denied admission solely because he was
male. Id. at 720-21. Although the school would allow Hogan to audit the courses he was interested in,
he could not enroll for credit. Id. at 721.
98. Id. at 724. The Court also noted that the policy was not exempted from scrutiny or subject to
a reduced standard of review just because the policy discriminated against males instead of females.
Id. at 723.
99. Id. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 724-25.
101. Id. at 725. Examples of objectives that are not sufficiently important to support gender-
based classifications include: reducing the court's workload, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971),
eliminating family controversy, id. at 77, and achieving administrative efficiency, Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973). Examples of important governmental objectives include:
reduction of the disparity in economic conditions between men and women, Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313, 317 (1977), protection of public health and safety, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200
(1976), and preventing illegitimate teenage pregnancy, Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981).
102. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725. A useful way of analyzing this prong of the test is to determine
why the gender-based classification serves the state's purpose better than a gender-neutral
classification. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that government
cannot meet its burden without showing that a gender-neutral statute would be a less effective means
of achieving the governmental goal). If a gender-neutral classification serves the state's purpose as
well, the direct link has not been established. See Off v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282 (1979) (stating that the
state's compensatory purpose is served as well by a gender-neutral classification, thus the state cannot
discriminate on the basis of sex).
103. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726. A gender-based classification must comport with actual fact to be
upheld. Craig, 429 U.S. at 199. Often, in addition to closely examining the factual basis of a
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gender is not being used as a proxy for other, more accurate bases of
classifications. 104 Thus, gender may not serve as a proxy for financial
dependency, 105 drinking and driving,106 financial need, 10 7 bias, or juror
competence. 0 8
In applying the test in Hogan, the Court held that neither prong of
the test had been satisfied. 109 Mississippi University for Women's pri-
mary justification for its female-only admissions policy was educational
affirmative action, to compensate for discrimination against women.110
The Court agreed that a compensatory purpose could justify a discrim-
inatory classification, but only if the members of the preferred gender
had actually suffered from a disadvantage related to that classification.l I I
It was obvious to the Court that women had never been disadvantaged in
the nursing profession."l 2 Thus, educational affirmative action could not
have been the state's actual purpose."l 3
The Court went on to evaluate the state's means and held that the
gender-based classification was not substantially or directly related to its
proposed compensatory objective. 114 Since men were allowed to audit
classes at Mississippi University for Women, the state could not carry its
gender-based classification, the proffered objective of the challenged classification is scrutinized by
the Court to see if it is the actual purpose. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730 (stating that the compensatory
purpose of the classification was not established as the actual purpose); Craig, 429 U.S. at 200 (stating
that although public health and safety was an important objective, it was not apparent that it was the
true purpose of the statutory scheme); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)
(stating that the Court need not accept "assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the
legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of
the legislation"); see also Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S. 76, 86-88 (1979) (analyzing whether the
proffered explanation that reducing the incentive for a father to desert his family was an important
objective of the statutory scheme and finding no evidence that the gender distinction was designed to
address the problem of desertion). But see Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469-470 (stating that the search
for a statute's actual purpose is elusive, thus the proffered purpose should be at least one of the
legislature's actual purposes).
104. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 198).
105. See Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645 (stating that the generalization that men are more likely to
be the primary breadwinner may be a good one but that it does not justify depriving social security
benefits to those families where the woman was the primary supporter); see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
678-79 (striking down a statutory entitlement scheme that gave married servicemen an automatic
increased quarters allowance and medical care for their wives but required married servicewomen to
demonstrate that their husbands were actually dependent on them before receiving the benefits).
106. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-02.
107. Orr, 440 U.S. at 281.
108. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129, 144(1994).
109. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
110. Id. at 727. Agreeing that a gender-based classification could be used for a benign and
compensatory purpose, the Court stated that it still would require the purported benign purpose to be
the actual purpose. Id. at 728.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 729. As the Court noted, when MUW began its operation 98% of all employed reg-
istered nurses were female; thus, instead of compensating women, this type of classification perpet-
uated the stereotype that nursing was woman's work. Id.




burden in proving that the gender-based classification was necessary to
reach any of the school's educational goals.115
The last Supreme Court case defining the current status of gender-
based classifications in equal protection analysis is J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B. 116 J.E.B. established that the use of peremptory challenges on
the basis of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause.11 7 The inter-
mediate scrutiny test in J.E.B. was perhaps the strictest formulation util-
ized by a majority of the Court. 118 The Court in J.E.B. firmly stated:
"Today we reaffirm what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal
Protection Clause, particularly, where, as here, the discrimination serves
to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes
about the relative abilities of men and women."119
The most notable aspect of the J.E.B. decision was the Court's
consistent comparison of gender to race. 120 The Court's indiscriminate
application of previous race discrimination rulings to gender without
eroding the previous rulings suggested that something more than inter-
mediate scrutiny was actually being applied.121 This is especially in-
triguing since the Court observed, in a footnote, that the issue of whether
gender-based classifications are inherently suspect and subject to strict
scrutiny was open. 122 Whatever the implications of the J.E.B. language
are, suffice it to say that the Court was adamant that gender-based
classifications must satisfy an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to
withstand constitutional scrutiny.123
115. Id. at 730-31. The evidence revealed that men auditing classes were allowed to fully par-
ticipate in class, the presence of men did not affect the teaching style employed, and that the men did
not dominate the class or otherwise affect the performance of the female students. Id. at 731.
116. 511 U.S. 127(1994).
117. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994). J.E.B. extended to gender the
decision of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which held that the use of peremptory challenges
on the basis of race violated equal protection. Id. at 146.
118. Brake, supra note 75, at 957.
119. J.E.B.,511U.S. at 131.
120. See id. at 136-141. The Court noted that historically women and African-Americans had
been excluded from juries. Id. at 136. The Court stated that the gross generalizations that would be
deemed impermissible on the basis of race are not permissible when based on gender. Id. at 140. This
is because discrimination based on gender and race causes harm to the litigants, the community, and
the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded. Id. The Court concluded that striking potential
jurors based upon their gender is "practically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of
inferiority." Id. at 141 (quoting classic language from Sttauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1880)).
121. Brake, supra note 75, at 957-58. Brake explains that the Court's rejection of gender-based
peremptory strikes as an "overbroad" proxy of an individual's views is very close to the rule under
strict scrutiny that the use of a racial classification must be necessary to achieve the state's legitimate
objective. Id.
122. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.6.
123. Id. at 136.
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After a violation of the equal protection clause has been estab-
lished, the issue of providing the individual with a remedy arises. 124 In-
deed, the court has a duty to render a decree that will eliminate the dis-
crimination of the past and prevent discrimination in the future.125 It has
been established that the remedy must closely fit the constitutional vio-
lation. 126 Therefore, the remedy must place those persons in the dis-
favored classification in the position they would have occupied in the
absence .of discrimination.127
I. LEGAL ANALYSIS
In VMI III, the United States Supreme Court addressed two
issues.1 28 First, whether Virginia's exclusion of women from VMI
denied to those women, who had the requisite capability, the equal
protection of the laws. 129 Second, if VMI's admission policy violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, what
constituted an appropriate remedy.130
A. ESTABLISHING A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In determining whether VMI's admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court examined whether Virginia had demonstrat-
ed an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for excluding women from
VMI.131 That question required Virginia to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged classification served "important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed [were] substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."1 32
In defense of VMI's admissions policy, Virginia offered two
justifications for excluding women from the school.133 First, Virginia
argued that single-gender education provided educational benefits and
contributed to diversity in the Commonwealth's educational system.134
124. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (discussing the equitable principles
involved in effectuating a desegregation decree).
125. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
126. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 280.
127. Id.
128. VMI III, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996).
129. d. Virginia challenged the liability determination found by the court of appeals in VMI 1.
Id at 2276.
130. Id. at 2274.
131. Id. The Court noted that this was the core instruction from recent precedent. Id. (citing
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136 and Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
132. Id. at 2275 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that the heightened review did not make sex a




1997] CASE COMMENT 337
Second, Virginia argued that VMI's unique style would have to be
modified, and might be lost, if VMI was forced to admit women. 135
In reviewing whether Virginia had demonstrated an important gov-
ernmental objective, the Court accepted as uncontested the facts that
single-sex education provided educational benefits and that diversity
among public educational institutions could serve the public good.
13 6
However, the Court closely examined whether VMI had actually been
established or maintained in an effort to diversify the state's educational
opportunities.137 The Court found no recorded evidence which indi-
cated that VMI had excluded women under an espoused policy of
diversity. 138
Once the Court concluded that diversity was not the actual purpose
for VMI's admissions policy, the Court considered Virginia's argument
that maintaining the adversative method was an important governmental
objective. 139 Virginia argued that the educational benefits provided by
the adversative method could not be made available to women without
destroying VMI.140 The Court disagreed. 141 Although the Court agreed
135. Id. at 2276, 2279.
136. Id. at 2276-77. The Court noted that it did not question a state's prerogative to even-
handedly support diverse educational opportunities. Id. at 2276 n.7. The Court's only concern in this
case was an educational opportunity that had been recognized as "unique' and available only at VMI.
Id.
137. Id. at 2277. The Court noted that in equal protection cases the proffered justification must
describe the actual state purpose, and not one that was invented post hoc in response to litigation. Id.
at 2275, 2277.
138. Id. at 2279. The Court stressed that diversity could not have been the goal of establishing
VMI since higher education was denied to women in 1839 as it was considered dangerous. Id. at
2277. At that time, hard study was thought to interfere with the development of women's reproductive
systems. Id. n.9. Furthermore, it was not until 1884 that Virginia provided women with higher
education. Id. at 2278. Yet by the mid-1970's all of Virginia's public female-only schools had
become coeducational. Id. Virginia tried to characterize the absence of current single-sex public
higher education schools for women as an anomaly. Id. However, the Court found that there had
been deliberate action on the part of the state that accounted for the absence of public all-female
higher education institutions. Id. Moreover, as of the Hogan decision in 1982, VMI had reexamined
its admissions policy but this reexamination provided no persuasive evidence that the school had
retained its admissions policy for the purpose of diversity. Id. at 2278-79.
139. Id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that a state does not
have a substantial interest in the adversative methodology unless it is pedagogically beneficial, which it
was not since no evidence in the record established that the adversative method was more likely to
produce the desired character traits than other methods. Id. at 2290-91.
140. Id. at 2279. The argument, as posed by Virginia, encompassed a catch-22: "Men would be
deprived of the unique opportunity currently available to them; women would not gain that opportunity
because their participation would eliminate the very aspects of the program that distinguish VMI from
other institutions of higher education in Virginia." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. See id. at 2280-81 (explaining that Virginia's justification for excluding women from VMI,
namely that alterations would have to be made, was not an "exceedingly persuasive justification").
The Court stated that the notion that admitting women into VMI would destroy the school had hardly
been proven. Id. at 2280. These types of arguments, the Court explained, had been utilized in the past
to deny women other rights and opportunities. Id. For example, the case of In re Application of
Martha Angle Dorsett, it was explained that women were kept out of the legal profession because
women couldn't handle "the responsibilities connected with the successful practice of law," and the
court had a "desire to grade up the profession." Id. at 2280-81 (citing In re Application of Martha
Angle Dorsett (Minn. C.P. Hennepin Cty., 1876) in SYLLABI, Oct. 21, 1876, at 5). Furthermore, the
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:323
that women's admission would require some accommodations,1 42 the
Court acknowledged what the lower courts had found: that the VMI
methodology could be used to educate women, that some women would
want to attend VMI, that some women were capable of all of the activities
required of the cadets, and that some women could achieve the physical
standards. 143 The Court issued a reminder that individual qualified
persons could not be denied an opportunity offered by the state based
on "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females."1 44
As the Court understood the argument, Virginia had focused on the
means rather than the end.145 The goal or end was to create "citizen-
soldiers," instead Virginia had treated single-sex education as the end.146
Properly understood, the goal of creating "citizen-soldiers," VMI's mis-
sion, was not substantially advanced by the categorical exclusion of
women from VMI.147 In the Court's words, "Surely that goal is great
enough to accommodate women." 148 Thus, the Court concluded that
Virginia had not established a legitimate governmental objective for
employing a gender-based classification for admission into VMI.149
Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority's conclusion in the
case, but wrote separately to express different views on the analysis.150
same arguments were used to deny admission of women into the medical field. Id. at 2281. The Court
found the arguments unpersuasive and instead found it instructive that the federal military academies
had successfully accepted women. Id.
142. Id. at 2279. It was accepted by the court of appeals that three aspect's of VMI's method
would require alterations-physical training, the absence of privacy, and the adversative approach.
Id.
143. Id. at 2279. The question for the Court turned on whether Virginia could constitutionally
deny to those women that had the will and the capacity the unique opportunity of a VMI education. Id.
at 2280.
144. Id. (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)). The Court
opined that the district court had made findings based on expert testimony that exemplified the typical
thinking about men and women, such as: men thrive in an atmosphere of adversativeness but women
need a cooperative environment. Id. at 2279.
145. Id. at 2281.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2282. The Court pointed out that in 1968, VMI had successfully integrated black men
into the school, and that this integration had little effect on VMI's method of accomplishing its mission.
Id. n.16.
148. Id. at 2282.
149. Id. Since the Court held that the proposed justifications for VMI's male only admission
policy were not important governmental objectives, the Court did not consider whether a substantial
relationship, the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny test, had been proven. See id. (noting that
Virginia had not established an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its use of a gender-based
classification).
150. Id. at 2287 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist also differed in the way
the Court defined the constitutional violation. Id. at 2291. It was his view that the violation was not the
"exclusion of women" from VMI, "but the maintenance of an all-men school without providing
any-much less a comparable-institution for women." Id. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist was not as
limited in his formulation of a remedy, he thought it sufficient if the state prove it was dedicated to
single-gender education for males and females by providing two institutions that offered the same
quality of education and were of the same overall calibre. Id.
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First, the Chief Justice took issue with the majority's reliance on the
phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification."' 5 ' In his view, the Court
had introduced an element of uncertainty to the test for gender-based
classifications.152 Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that the phrase was best
confined to an observation on the difficulty of surviving the intermediate
scrutiny test and not as a formulation of the test itself.15 3
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that it was improper to
draw any negative inferences from VMI's history before the case of
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.154 His opinion was that VMI
was not on notice that its male-only admissions policy violated equal
protection until a case actually involving a single-sex admission policy in
higher education had been decided. 155
B. DEVELOPING A REMEDY FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
After concluding that VMI's admission policy did indeed violate
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court turned to the issue of reviewing
the remedy presented by Virginia.I56 Virginia's remedial plan main-
tained VMI as an all-male program and created a separate program,
VWIL, for women. 157
In developing a remedy for a constitutional violation, the Court
instructed that the remedy chosen should eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the past and prohibit discrimination in the future. 158 The court
defined the constitutional violation as "the categorical exclusion of wo-
men from an extraordinary educational opportunity afforded men." 159
The Court stated that the creation of a separate program did not
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past.160 Thus, it was incum-
151. Id. at 2288.
152. Id.
153. Id. The Chief Justice would have preferred to adhere to the traditional test of that demands
a gender-based classification to "bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental
objectives." Id. (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
Obviously he was concerned that the lower courts potentially would use the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" as a new standard of review. See id.
154. See VMI III, 116 S. Ct. at 2289-90.
155. VMI I1, 116 S. Ct. at 2289. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that in 1839 it was not
unconstitutional to limit admissions to men since the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to
require heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination was over a century away, Id. at 2288. Like-
wise, none of the cases leading up to Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), were sufficiently on point to put
VMI on notice. Id. at 2288-89.
156. Id. at 2282.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Court stated that the constitutional violation present was the categorical exclusion of
women from an extraordinary educational opportunity afforded only to men. Id. Thus, Virginia was
obligated to create a remedy directly addressed to this violation. Id. But, as the Court noted, Virginia
had left untouched VMI's admissions policy. Id. Instead, it proposed a separate program that was
both different in kind and unequal in tangible and intangible benefits. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2283.
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bent upon Virginia to prove that VWLL would bar like-discrimination in
the future. 16 1 After comparing the VMI and VWIL programs, the Court
recognized that substantial differences existed. 162 Due to these differ-
ences, the Court did not believe that VWIL could achieve the goal of
eliminating discrimination in the future.163
In addition to not providing VWIL students with a military train-
ing, VWIL lacked a comparable student body, faculty, course offerings,
and facilities.164 Furthermore, VWIL would not provide its graduates
with the history, prestige, and connections of a VMI degree.165 In the
end, the Court concluded that Virginia's remedy did not address the
constitutional violation of denying to women a unique educational
opportunity. 166 Thus, the Court stated that Virginia must genuinely pro-
vide those women that want and are fit for a VMI education with nothing
less.167
161. Id. Virginia asserted that since VWIL shared VMI's mission to produce "citizen-soldiers"
and VMI's goals of providing education, military training, mental and physical discipline, character
and leadership development, it would bar like discrimination in the future. Id.
162. Id. at 2283-84. VWIL did not provide a rigorous military training, instead the program
stressed a "cooperative method" which would reinforce self-esteem. Id. at 2283. VWIL student's
exposure to the military education would be mostly ceremonial. Id. The VWIL house did not contain
barracks or "the spartan living arrangements that were designed to foster an 'egalitarian ethic."' Id.
Moreover, the women would not be required to live together for the four-year program, eat meals
together, or wear the uniform during the school day. Id. The leadership training for VWIL students
would come mostly from seminars, speaker series, and externships; VWIL students would not be
exposed to "physical rigor, mental stress, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable
values" the hallmark of VMI's citizen-soldier program. Id.
163. See id. at 2284 (explaining that since this suit was brought on behalf of those women that
wanted to attend, and were capable of being VMI cadets, a remedy had to be crafted to suit them).
164. Id. VWIL students would graduate with a Mary Baldwin College (MBC) degree. Id. MBC
enrolls first-year students with an average combined SAT score about 100 points lower than first-year
students at VMI. Id. MBC faculty has significantly fewer Ph.D.'s, and the faculty earns lower
salaries than VMI. Id. The MBC curriculum is more limited than VMI's, as it lacks a math and
science focus. Id. MBC athletic facilities includes two multi-purpose fields and one gymnasium, while
VMI has an "NCAA competition level indoor track and field facility; a number of multi-purpose
fields; baseball, soccer, and lacrosse fields; an obstacle course; large boxing, wrestling and martial
arts facilities; an I 1-laps-to-the-mile indoor running course; an indoor pool; indoor and outdoor rifle
ranges; and a football stadium." Id. at 2284-85. Financially, MBC has a current endowment of $19
million and will gain an additional $35 million based on future commitments; VMI has a current
endowment of $131 million and will gain $220 million. Id. at 2285.
165. Id. at 2285. The Court explained that the VMI alumni are exceptionally close to the school
and actively recruit VMI graduates, whereas this network of alumni would not necessarily be as
receptive to the untested VWIL graduates. Id.
166. Id. at 2287. In the last portion of the Court's opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
was chastised for engaging in a deferential review of Virginia's remedial plan, instead of the exacting
standard that the precedent required. Id. at 2286.
167. Id. at 2287. The sole dissenting voice was that of Justice Antonin Scalia. Id. at 2291
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia believed that the majority had not honestly applied the test
applicable to gender-based classifications. Id. at 2293. Fairly applying the intermediate level of
review would have led to the conclusion that VMI's admission policy did not violate equal protection
according to Justice Scalia. Id. at 2296-97. He opined that Virginia had an important state interest in
providing effective college education to it citizens, and that single-sex education was an approach




As with most United States Supreme Court cases, the full impact of
United States v. Virginia is yet to be realized.168 From a factual
perspective, at least two substantial advances were made by United States
v. Virginia: both VM1169 and the Citadel,170 an all-male military college
in South Carolina, decided to admit women into their ranks.171 From a
legal perspective, at least two points are worthy of recognition. First, in
United States v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court stressed the
importance of the individual in structuring a remedy for an equal
protection violation.1 7 2 Second, the Court left open the question of
whether the standard for gender-based classifications was implicitly
changed.173
A. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE PROTECTS INDIVIDUALS
The Court's insistence that the VMI methodology could be used to
educate women who were capable of the individual activities required of
cadets demonstrated the Court's dedication to protecting individual
rights within the Equal Protection Clause. 174 Even though the Court
assumed that most women would not want a VMI education, it was
168. In fact, the unknown impact was what Justice Scalia feared. Id. at 2305. He was of the
opinion that the Court's decision left single-sex public education functionally dead. Id. at 2306.
However, the Court responded to this concern by stating that the Court did not question the state's
prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities, the only question here was an
educational analysis that was considered "unique." Id. at 2276 n.7.
169. Donald P. Baker, By One Vote, VMI Decides to Go Coed, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at
Al. The Board of Visitors of VMI could have opted to privatize the school instead of going
co-educational. Id. However, by a vote of one, the Board of Visitors decided to go co-educational.
Id. The cost of privatization was estimated between $200 million and $400 million, which included
buying the campus and making up for state support. Ellen Nakashima & Spencer S. Hsu, Allen to
VMI: Admit Women Or Be a Pariah, WASH. PosT, Sept. 19, 1996, at BI.
170. Catherine S. Manegold, Citadel Adopts Positive View of Its Female Cadets, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
24, 1996, at Al.
171. The admission of women into these two all male military colleges requires a significant
change that was not directly addressed by the Court: the tradition of hazing along gender lines. As
one commentator notes, part of the hazing ritual of both schools is to "castigate (new cadets] for being
'sissies,' 'pussies,' or 'fucking little girls."' Lucinda M. Finley, Sex-Blind, Separate But Equal, or
Anti-Subordination? The Uneasy Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson for Sex and Gender Discrimination, 12
GA. L. REv. 1089, 1116 (1996). In fact, the author argues that had the courts taken into consideration
the "pathologically gendered aspects of VMI and Citadel culture" the prospect of changing the culture
would have been the best argument for admitting women. Id. at 1117. The legacy that "real men" are
aggressive, assaultive, and demeaning to others, must necessarily change with women arriving. Id. at
1116-17. The change will be beneficial to all, since the male cadets are less likely to come out of
VMI and the Citadel as "walking sexual harassment liability nightmares for prospective employers, or
as potentially abusive intimate partners, or hated ogre bosses." Id. at 1117.
172. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
173. See Brake, supra note 75, at 958 (stating that the Court may be indicating a willingness to
reconsider strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications after J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127 (1994)).
174. See VMI Ill, 116 S. Ct. at 2279 (discussing the lower court findings).
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enough that some women would choose the adversative method to hold
that VWIL did not cure the constitutional violation. 175
The problem with VWIL was that it was created for women as a
group, with the Task Force concentrating on what the average woman
would prefer.1 76 The effect of the Task Force's concentration on
women as a group was that it overlooked that "estimates of what is
appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to
women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average
description."177 As the Court pointed out, "Virginia had never asserted
that VMI's method of education suits most men."178 Since VMI was not
constructed for the average group of men, it was startling that Virginia
constructed VWIL for the average group of women. 179
The Court's focus on the individual was reminiscent of Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke.180 The lesson learned from Bakke
was that the focus of equal protection analysis must be on protecting
individuals against classifications based upon racial or ethnic consider-
ations because those classifications impinge upon personal rights.I18
The lesson to be learned from United States v. Virginia is the importance
of protecting individuals when crafting a remedy for a constitutional
violation.18 2 Since women's personal individual constitutional rights had
been infringed, the remedy must go to the heart of the constitutional
wrong. 183 In this case the heart of the wrong was denying women
admission into a state sponsored school, thus the remedy, admission into
VMI, was directed at that wrong.184
175. See id at 2280 (explaining that education is not a "one size fits all" business).
176. See id. at 2283.
177. Id. at 2284 (emphasis original). It is worthy of recognition that former North Dakota
Supreme Court Justice Beryl Levine's work was cited by the United States Supreme Court in VMI Ill.
See id. at 2286 n.20. Justice Levine had explained that in the days of Plato the question of whether
women should be afforded the equal opportunity to become guardians of Platonic society did not
center on women's abilities; their ability to perform was not seriously questioned, instead the concern
was over women performing the nude exercises that were prerequisites to becoming a guardian.
Levine, Closing Comments, 6 LAW & INEQ. J. 41, 41 (1988) (presentation at Eighth Circuit Judicial
Conference, Colorado Springs, Colo., July 17, 1987). The Court compared this with the more
prevalent view that women just were not fit for occupations in society. See VMIl II1, 116 S. Ct. at 2286
n.20.
178. VMJ III, 116 S. Ct. at 2284 (emphasis original).
179. As explained by Senior Circuit Judge Phillips in his dissent in the remedial phase of VMI II,
the adoption of VWIL may not be that startling since "the primary, overriding purpose [was] not to
create a new type of educational opportunity for women .... but [was] simply... to allow VMI to
continue to exclude women in order to preserve its historic character and mission .... " VMI II, 44
F.3d 1229, 1247 (4th Cir. 1995) (remedial phase) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
180. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
181. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978). The Court in Bakke made
clear that the Constitution does not provide less protection to racial classifications that disadvantage the
"white majority." Id. at 295-96.
182. See VMJ III, 116 S. Ct. at 2282-83.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 2286-87. A separate option would be for VMI to abandon all state financial
support for the school.
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B. HAS THE STANDARD CHANGED FOR GENDER-BASED
CLASSIFICATIONS?
It may be ironic to some and poetic to others that the opinion in
Virginia was authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.18 5 Before becom-
ing a judge and a justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg had devoted her legal
profession to gaining equality for women. 186 As director of the Wo-
men's Rights Project, Ginsburg endeavored to have the Court declare
gender as a suspect classification. 187 Only when it was clear that the
Court was unlikely to adopt strict scrutiny, did Ginsburg relent and
adjust her objective toward an intermediate standard of review. 188
Even though the Court has never stated that the strict scrutiny test
applies to gender-based classifications, the language and analysis used in
United States v. Virginia, seemed to betray the Court's assurance that
gender is not a proscribed classification. 189 Furthermore, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence hinted at this concern when he suggested that
the Court's reliance on the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" introduced an element of uncertainty into the standard of review
used in gender-based classifications. 190 Justice Scalia also voiced his
concern that precedent had been drastically changed because the Court
had effectively accepted strict scrutiny as the standard for reviewing
gender-based classifications.191 A traditional application of intermediate
scrutiny does not require a classification to hold true in all instances. 192
However, the Court's focus on the individual over most women in
developing a remedy implies that the Court was looking for more than a
substantial relationship between means and end. Indeed, it appears that
the Court was searching for a necessary relationship between the two.
Considering the Court's announcement that strict scrutiny is not inevita-
185. See id. at 2269 (delivering the opinion of the Court).
186. See Markowitz, supra note 66, at 337. Ginsburg was the first director of the Women's
Rights Project (WRP), a division of the ACLU. Id. at 337. Ginsburg, through the ACLU and the WRP,
was involved in over half of the 63 gender-based cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1969
and 1980. Id.
187. See id. at 340-46 (outlining Ginsburg's involvement in the gender-based discrimination
cases).
188. Id. at 346. Ginsburg's litigation strategy of building a body of precedent to lead the Court to
adopt a heightened level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications was a success. Id. at 357.
Although a few cases did set back Ginsburg's progression, overall she was successful in convincing
the Court that the classification in question relied on disadvantaging stereotypes about women and thus
was impermissible. Id. at 359.
189. See VM1 111, 116 S. Ct. at 2275. In fact, the Court says in a footnote that "thus far" the most
stringent scrutiny has been reserved for classifications based on race or national origin. Id. at 2275
n.6.
190. See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
191. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing that a true application of intermediate
scrutiny does not require a least restrictive means analysis, but only a "substantial relation" between
the state's interest and means).
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bly fatal in fact, 193 and the concern of two members of the Court, one
wonders if Justice Ginsburg is still persuading the Supreme Court to
announce that gender is a suspect classification.
•Shanon M. Gregor
193. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
